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RISK, EVERYDAY INTUITIONS, AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF TORT LAW
Govind C. Persad*
This Note offers a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed
by deontological moral theory, in the context of the debate over whether tort

litigation or a non-tort approach is the appropriateresponse to mass harm. The
first Partargues that the diference between lay and expert intuitions about risk

and harm often reflects a difference in normative judgments about the existing
facts, rather than a difference in belief about whatfacts exist, which makes the
lay intuitions more defensible. The secondPartconsiders how tort has dealt with
this divergence between lay and expert perspectives. It also evaluates how tort's
approach has diferedfrom that ofpublic law approachesto accident law, such
as legislative compensation and risk regulation by administrative agencies.

Ultimately, tort's ability to recognize the value of lay intuitions supports retaining
the tortperspective as part of our societalarsenalof responses to risk and harm.
This ability can also support apro-tortperspective in two practicaldebates in the
arena of tort law: that over preemption of tort law by administrative agency
judgments, and that over access to tort recovery as part of a no-fault system.
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INTRODUCTION

This Note will argue that the intuitions and values of ordinary people
regarding the problems of mass risk and mass harm deserve a place in our legal
system, and that part of traditional tort law's enduring appeal as a way of
addressing the problem of mass harm, and compensating victims, derives from
the distinctive way in which tort can give voice and force to these intuitions and
values. Alternative attempts to address mass harm, such as risk regulation and
no-fault compensation, have tended to prioritize experts' views about risk and
harm and to deemphasize laypeople's perspectives.' While the perspectives of
expert scientists, physicians, and policymakers matter, other perspectives
matter as well, and often matter equally-particularly where values, rather than
facts, are in dispute. 2 The need to incorporate lay as well as expert perspectives
has implications for the intersection of tort law with both risk regulation and
no-fault compensation schemes. Recognizing the importance of the lay
perspective, and tort's ability to capture that perspective, should lead us to
resist widespread preemption of the tort system by regulation or the total
bypass of tort by no-fault.
Part I will explore several ways in which laypeople's intuitions about risk
diverge from the findings that cost-benefit analysis and other expert-driven
methods suggest. Laypeople's intuitions often capture values that experts miss
or find difficult to adequately represent within their preferred framework. More
generally, the difference between lay and expert intuitions about risk and harm
often reflects a difference in values or normative judgments about the existing
facts, rather than a difference in belief about what facts exist.
Part II considers how tort has dealt with this divergence between lay and

B.S.,
Stanford
B.A.,
Law
School;
Stanford
* J.D.
Candidate,
University, 2006. I am grateful to Professors Robert Rabin and Mark
Kelman for helping me to formulate my topic, and to the Notes
Committee of the Stanford Law Review for its extremely helpful feedback on an earlier draft.
1. In the context of risk regulation, see, for example, STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
VICIoUs CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); HOWARD MARGOLIS,
DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
(1996); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 53-77

(2002). In the no-fault context, see, for example, David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan,
Toward a Workable Model of "No-Fault" Compensationfor Medical Injury in the United

States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 230, 232 (2001) (favorably discussing the systems of
medical injury compensation in Sweden and New Zealand, in which "[s]treamlined
adjudication pathways" and "expert panels," rather than courts, set compensation schedules
based on "basic information about the circumstances of the incident and the nature of the
disability suffered," and recommending the employment of a similar system in the United
States).

2. For the importance of whether judgments are grounded in facts or values, see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63; for a challenge to the idea that fact and value can be
separated,

see

K.S.

SHRADER-FRECHETrE,

RISK

AND

RATIONALITY:

PHILOSOPHICAL

FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 43 (1991) ("[I]t is doubtful that there can be a

complete dichotomy between facts and values.").
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expert perspectives. It also evaluates how tort's approach has differed from that
of public law approaches to accident law, such as legislative compensation and
risk regulation by administrative agencies.
Part II will argue that the differences between tort law, on the one hand,
and no-fault and risk regulation, on the other, show that tort law is worth
preserving. Tort tends to be more willing to privilege the intuitions of nonexperts-including both judges and juries. There is value in retaining this
perspective as part of our societal arsenal of responses to risk and harm. While
risk regulation and legislative compensation are important parts of a systematic
societal approach to the problems of risk and harm, they should not be allowed
to totally drive tort law from the scene.
Part III considers the consequences of the earlier analysis for two current
territorial disputes at the boundaries of tort law. One of the most prominent
arenas where expert-driven analysis has recently competed with tort for the
same turf has been that of preemption, where state tort law and Food and Drug
Administration
(FDA) regulations
prescribe
different
consequences.
Recognizing the importance of everyday intuitions justifies a restrained attitude

about preemption, one that accords with the majority view in the Court's recent
decision in Wyeth v. Levine. 3 Tort also overlaps with no-fault compensation
schemes, particularly in medical contexts; here, everyday intuitions support
allowing access to a tort alternative in vaccine compensation and other no-fault
schemes, rather than requiring that such access be waived. Ultimately, while
the methods of risk regulation and no-fault compensation have clear value, tort
retains a distinctive ability to reflect and give force to public intuitions about
risk and should not be eliminated or totally bypassed in favor of other
approaches.

This Note attempts to take the extensive legal scholarship on tort, no-fault,
and preemption, as well as work in behavioral economics and moral philosophy
on everyday intuitions about risk, in a different direction than the existing
literature. Much of the existing work either defending or criticizing the tort
system in comparison to alternatives focuses on other differences between tort
and its competitors-for instance, federalism and separation of powers
concerns. 4 The scholarship that focuses on cost-benefit analysis and behavioral
economics, such as Cass Sunstein's and Howard Margolis's work, has
primarily used the cost-benefit perspective to criticize tort law.5 Finally,

although some philosophers have attempted to normatively criticize the
behavioral aspects of cost-benefit analysis, their work has not focused
3. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that a manufacturer's compliance with FDA
labeling requirements does not provide a complete defense to a state product liability claim).
4. See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemptionby Preamble: FederalAgencies and the

Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 227 (2007).
5.

See MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 211 (contrasting the assessments of experts with

those of "lay judges"). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 (arguing for "a more sensible
system of risk regulation, embodied in the idea of a cost-benefit state").
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specifically on the legal arena. 6 In contrast, this Note attempts to bolster the
tort system via a normative critique of cost-benefit analysis, one informed by
deontological moral theory.
I.

RISK, EVERYDAY INTUITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

The differences between expert judgments and ordinary intuitions often
reflect differences that are at least in part differences about values, and not
merely differences in understandingfacts. Within the realm of values, ordinary
people are sometimes right and experts wrong.
Cass Sunstein has been one of the foremost proponents of a cost-benefit
approach to risks. Sunstein argues that "people's intuitions about risk are highly
unreliable. Some of those intuitions do serve us well in ordinary life. But even
so, they lead to ineffective and even counterproductive law and policy." 7
Sunstein discusses several such commonplace intuitions about risk in his work.
His claims and examples are paradigmatic of the cost-benefit critique of
commonplace intuitions, and as such will serve as an entree to the project of
understanding the normative basis for these intuitions.
A. Incoherence, Intransitivity, and Context-SensitiveJudgments

Sunstein asks us to consider the following situation:
Suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any other problem,
how much you would be willing to pay to protect [against] certain threats to
coral reefs. Now suppose that you are asked to say, without reference to any
other problem, how much you would pay to protect against skin cancer among
the elderly. Suppose, finally, that you are asked to say how much you would
be willing to pay to protect [against] certain threats to coral reefs and how
much you would be willing to pay to protect against skin cancer among the
elderly. Empirical evidence suggests that people's answers to questions, taken
in isolation, are very different from their answers to questions when they are
asked to engage in cross-category comparisons. 8

Sunstein assumes that the differences between willingness to pay in these
different contexts are "a form of incoherence." 9 And incoherence, or
unreflective assumptions about facts, may often be what explains these
differences.
But there is also a normatively respectable explanation for ordinary
6. See, e.g., F.M. KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICs: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
PERMISSIBLE HARM (2007) (advocating a nonconsequentialist ethical theory).
7. SuNsTEIN, supra note 1, at 29 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 48.
9. Id. at 49; see also Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision

Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 310 (1996) (demonstrating that context-dependent decisionmaking occurs in legal contexts and arguing that "context-dependent decision-making is
problematic when actors make legal judgments").
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people's different intuitions in these cases: their preferences may not be
incoherent, but simply intransitive. And intransitive preferences are often
perfectly sensible. Consider this example, from Bruce Chapman:
Suppose, for example, that someone is offered a choice of fruit at the end of a
dinner. If only a large apple, A, and a large orange, 0, are offered to her, she
would choose the large apple. Both fruits are large and, all else equal, she
prefers apples to oranges. However, if she is offered A, 0, and a small apple,
a, then different considerations arise. For now there is an issue of etiquette to
be addressed. The rule, let us say, is that one should never choose the larger of
two items of the same kind. Our chooser now reasons that, in the choice from
the set (A, 0, a), she cannot now choose A, because that would be in breach of
the rule of etiquette. She therefore chooses 0, a piece of fruit that is larger
10
than a, but a fruit of a different kind.

As Frances Kamm has argued, intransitivity can be justified by our
different reasons (here, etiquette and taste) for each of the dominance
relations."' This intransitivity is perfectly comprehensible:
[D]espite this apparent "irrationality," what is happening in the etiquette
example is hardly incomprehensible to us . ... We simply understand the
choice situation (A, 0, a), where both A and a are present and etiquette is at
issue, differently from the choice situation (A, O), where a is absent and
etiquette is not at issue.12

Retuming to Sunstein's example, then, we could imagine that people are
willing to pay $10 million for coral reefs and an equal amount for protecting
against skin cancer among the elderly when they consider these options in
isolation. But, following Chapman, they may have good reason to pay more for
the elderly when the options are considered together, because the combination
of options in a choice set makes new reasons relevant. In particular, it may be
inappropriate or disrespectful to prefer an aesthetic or abstractly environmental
value like the beauty of a coral reef over human life in a situation of direct
comparison. (Consider this example: One might have good reason to give one's
nephew more money for his fifteenth birthday than his seventh, considered in
isolation. But if you have both a seven-year-old and a fifteen-year-old nephew,
it would be the foolish uncle who gave more money to one nephew than the
other: the disrespect shown would be evidenced by the cries of "he got more
than me!")
Of course, it is possible to normatively criticize the values, like etiquette in
Chapman's example, that the intransitive preferences reveal. Perhaps we should
abandon etiquette, and leave people free to go for the larger apple. Similarly,
perhaps we should be willing to value aesthetic values over human life. But this
10. Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV.

1169, 1177-78 (2003) (footnote omitted); see also Frances Myrna Kamm, Supererogation
and Obligation, 82 J. PHIL. 118, 118 (1985) (defending intransitive moral preferences via a
similar example).
I1. Kamm, supra note 10, at 135-36.
12. Chapman, supra note 10, at 1179.
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is a substantive normative criticism-a complaint that the intransitivity is
wrong, not that the intransitivity is incoherent. As such, it is squarely in the
realm of value rather than fact. And in the realm of value, there is no reason to
think that a scientific expert's opinion should carry any special weight
compared to that of thoughtful laypersons such as judges or juries.
B. Loss Aversion and the Doing-Allowing Distinction

Ordinary people distinguish harming others from failing to benefit them,
and evaluate the former as prima facie worse than the latter. Sunstein observes
and critiques this intuition, claiming that "[p]eople tend to be loss averse, which
means that a loss from the status quo is seen as more undesirable than a gain is
seen as desirable." 13 This loss aversion, he believes, leads ordinary people to
ignore benefits or fail to weigh them appropriately against harms. In contrast,
he praises experts as "prepared to look at the benefits as well as the risks
associated with controversial products and activities." 14 Although Sunstein
does not believe that the preference for preexisting risks over new ones is
always wrong, he believes that to the extent that greater concern about new
risks is justified, it is justified either by the new risk's greater magnitude, or by
the psychological fact of the risk being difficult to adjust to. 15 Both of these
factors are differences of degree, not kind: new risks are bad simply because
they correlate with more severe losses of welfare, due either to greater
magnitude or greater psychological upset caused to their victims, not because
of some qualitative problem with new risks. The idea that there could be
something else explaining what is wrong with exposing people to new risks is
perfunctorily rejected.16
Yet the distinction between a new and an old risk may track another
distinction: one that may seem "automatic" and "insufficiently reflective," but
in fact reflects the pull of a normative worldview-one that has an emotional
valence. Creating a new risk generates a new causal and moral relation between
risk-creator and victim: the risk-creator, should the new harm come to pass, is
responsible for harming the victim. She has done something to someone else. 17

13. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology of Choice

and the Assumptions of Economics, in QUAsI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 137, 143 (Richard H.
Thaler ed., 1991)).
14. Id at 64.
15. Id at 42 ("Of course, it is possible that a new risk is worse than an old risk, perhaps
because it is larger in degree, perhaps because people will have a hard time in adjusting to
it.").

16. Id. ("The problem is that loss aversion operates in an automatic, insufficiently
reflective manner so that preoccupation with new risks cannot possibly be justified in these
terms.").
17. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Action, Omission, and the Stringency of Duties, 142 U. PA.
L. REv. 1493 (1994); F.M. Kamm, Non-Consequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself

and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUn. AFF. 354, 386 (1992) [hereinafter Kamm,
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In contrast, allowing an old or preexisting risk to persist does not generate a
new relation: the person who fails to eliminate a preexisting risk has not
harmed the victim of that risk, but merely allowed the harm to continue. And
this distinction has force even in the absence of differences in magnitude of risk
or harm, and even when the magnitude of the harm points in favor of creating
the new risk. It is permissible to refuse to harm one person even when doing so
would save ten more from a preexisting harm, not because the new harm would
be worse for the single person than the preexisting harm would be for the ten,
but because it is permissible to refuse to set up that moral relation between
yourself and the person harmed.18
Upon reflection, this distinction between what we do and what we merely
allow seems also to have emotional immediacy as well as moral force: ordinary
people have an automatic, intuitive reaction to the doing-allowing distinction. 19
Yet, its psychological force seems different from, and deeper than, that of
simple loss aversion. 20 In particular, maintaining this distinction may be
essential to an important value: that of seeing ourselves as separate and
independent persons. 2 ' Of course, the claim that doing harm is in itself worse
than allowing it has its critics.22 But, as with the discussion of intransitivity
above, these critics are making a normative argument: one grounded in
contestable values, not in facts to which they have special access.
Of course, an act will not count as invariably "done" or "allowed": which
Non-Consequentialism] ("[T]he view being presented here emphasizes the distinction
between what it is permissible to do to a person . .. and what happens to persons ... . What
I do, rather than what happens, is important when it reveals what it is permissible to do, that
is, what the status of any person is."); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. REv. 287, 287 (1989). The

misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction can be seen as reflecting this distinction in tort law. See,
e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.)
("The failure in such circumstances to furnish an adequate supply of water is at most the
denial of a benefit. It is not the commission of a wrong.").
18. See Kamm, Non-Consequentialism, supra note 17, at 367-70.
19. See, e.g., Marc D. Hauser et al., Reviving Rawls's Linguistic Analogy: Operative

Principles and the Causal Structure of Moral Actions, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOL. 107, 125-35
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2009) (providing data that people generally see causing harm
as worse than allowing it); John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard

Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1057, 1088-1110
(2002) (defending the claim that humans have a "Universal Moral Grammar").
20. See F.M. Kamm, Moral Intuitions, Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-

Versus-Not-Aiding Distinction, 108 ETHics 463, 470-78 (1998) (arguing that Kahneman's
loss/no-gain distinction is different from a harming/not-aiding distinction).
21. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 17, at 289.
22. E.g., SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989). The extension of this
argument against the doing-allowing distinction to the legal context is discussed in Ernest J.

Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 249 (1980) (recapitulating the
Coasean view that when "distinctions based on causation are obliterated ... a plaintiff can
claim no special consideration as a victim of another's action, and a defendant does not

necessarily escape liability because the harm complained of was not caused by any of his
actions").
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side of the distinction it falls on will also depend on context, just as the
intransitive preferences above depend on context. What one person does,
another person may merely allow: the deaths of the ten are done by whoever set
the preexisting threat in motion, but allowed by the person who refuses to harm
the one in order to save the ten. Furthermore, from a broader institutional
perspective, the distinction between causing and allowing harm, and hence
between new and old risks, may break down: even though the doing-allowing
distinction is relevant for individuals, institutions such as governments may be
so intimately involved with all causal interactions that there is no normative
difference between their positive and negative responsibility for an outcome. 23
That the doing-allowing distinction may have different relevance for
individuals than it does for institutions will be important in later Parts of this
Note, which will explore how tort law, no-fault, and risk regulation respond to
moral intuitions like the doing-allowing distinction.
C. DreadedRisks, Self-Conceptions, and Expressive Rationality

Ordinary people also qualitatively distinguish risks and harms by type,
rather than simply quantifying the probability of death or other loss. Sunstein
discusses cases where ordinary people especially dread certain risks, such as
airplane crashes, while experts see the same risks as less serious.24 It is possible
that the public dreads these risks because they are making a factual mistake:
they believe that such risks are more likely than they actually are. This is what
now-Justice Breyer believes: "The public's 'nonexpert' reactions reflect not
different values but different understandings about the underlying risk-related
facts." 25 And indeed, some public judgments that differ from expert judgments
do seem to centrally depend on erroneous perceptions of the facts: for instance,
tort verdicts that are motivated by juries' willingness to give credence to
experts making incorrect factual claims on the basis of those experts' claims of
factual authority. 26 Such decisions do not reflect a disagreement about values,
but indeed reflect a public misunderstanding of facts.
However, other disagreements between lay intuitions and expert
assessment are not so easily dismissed. Ordinary people's differences from
experts may rest on disagreements about values, rather than disagreements
about facts. These responses may have to do with important values or self23.

See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY

84

(1991).

24. See SUNsTEIN, supra note 1, at 43.
25. BREYER, supra note 1, at 35; accordSUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 63 ("I suggest that,
in many cases, people's judgment that a certain risk is unusually bad is not a rich qualitative

assessment but is based on some combination of affect, rooted partly in an unreliable
intuition about the likelyfacts.").
26. See Richard S. Comfeld & Stuart F. Schlossman, Immunologic Laboratory Tests: A
Critique of the Alcolac Decision, in PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW

401, 401-24 (Kenneth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993) (discussing Elam v. Alcolac Inc., 765
S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
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conceptions that are particularly threatened by certain types of risk and harm:
"When people draw on their emotions to judge the risk that such an activity
poses, they form an expressively rational attitude about what it would mean for
their cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is
dangerous and worthy of regulation ... ."27 The particular concern about harms
that are caused rather than allowed that I discuss above could be understood as
an example of expressive rationality: it may derive from a widely shared selfconception of ourselves as separate persons. But there are many other such selfconceptions, such as egalitarianism, libertarianism, and tradition-oriented
conservatism, that could shape our views about risk. 28 While the judgments
about risk and social priorities that flow from these self-conceptions are
appropriately subject to normative criticism, and scientific evidence can play a
role in that criticism, scientific evidence cannot settle the question of which
self-conception we should adopt.29 For instance, a scientific finding that
secondhand smoke causes lung cancer in others who have not chosen to smoke
challenges the view that a libertarian perspective should permit smoking, but it
does not give us reason to accept or reject a libertarian position generally.
Many have argued that we should be skeptical about our intuitive
emotional responses, because intuitive responses lead us astray in many

contexts. 3 0 But this argument runs the risk of conflating the question of
whether intuitive emotional responses are appropriate guides in matters offact
with that of whether such responses are appropriate guides in matters of value.
We have good grounds to believe that our intuitive and emotional responses
can be poor guides with respect to statistical questions, or to measuring the
length of two lines.3 1 But it is by no means clear that intuitive, emotional
responses are poor guides to matters of value: indeed, people who lack the
capacity to respond intuitively to values are generally judged to be irrational, at
least where values are concerned. 32 That a ruler is a poor tool for the analysis

27. Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 741, 750-51 (2008); see also Tamar Schapiro, Three Conceptions of Action in Moral

Theory, 35 Nous 93, 93 (2001) (discussing the idea that action can be evaluated by what it
expresses, rather than its consequences).

28. Kahan, supra note 27, at 751 (discussing the ways in which egalitarian,
individualist, and socially conservative self-conceptions influence judgments about which
risks are to be avoided); see also PAUL SLOvIC, Introduction and Overview, in THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK, at xxi, xxxiv (2000) (discussing the effect of different "worldviews" on
risk perception).
29. E.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 110 ("It bears emphasizing that science cannot by
itself resolve normative questions. An understanding of likely consequences cannot resolve
issues of value.").
30. See, e.g., MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 39-47.

31. Id. at 53-59 (describing a statistical puzzle about poker chips, and the Muller-Lyer
illusion, in which two lines of the same length appear to be different in different contexts).
32. Kahan, supra note 27, at 750 (discussing the work of philosophers, psychologists,
and neuroscientists on the importance of emotion to appropriate reasoning about what goods
are valuable); see also Mikhail, supra note 19, at 1093-94 (discussing the importance of
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of poetry or for making policy decisions does not show that it lacks value in
measuring the length of two lines; in the same way, that our intuitive responses
are unreliable when it comes to measuring the length of lines does not show
that they are unreliable tools in the aesthetic or moral realms.
Sunstein also argues that we should be skeptical about basing our
normative views of risk on people's ex ante intuitions about risk, because of the
phenomenon of adaptation to harm, where people see a harm as less bad once
they have experienced it.33 But this is not quite right, particularly where risks
that pose a central threat to one's self-conception are concerned. We do not
always have to experience something to have a defensible position that it is
something to avoid. Sometimes an identity can involve not being open to
certain possibilities: for instance, the fact that a celibate person may see sexual
activity as less bad once she has experienced it does not give us reason to
ignore her present preference to avoid that temptation.
D. The Normative Respectabilityof Everyday Intuitions

This Part's goal has been to illustrate the normative respectability of
everyday intuitions as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis. The differences
between ordinary people and experts are often a matter of different values,
rather than simply different facts. 4 Sunstein argues that "[w]hen they disagree,
experts are generally right, and ordinary people are generally wrong.... When
ordinary people make mistakes, it is usually for three now-familiar reasons:
They rely on mental shortcuts; they are subject to social influences that led
them astray; and they neglect tradeoffs." 35 However, once we understand
everyday people's patterns of thought as potentially reflecting differences in
values rather than a lack of understanding of facts, everyday intuitions seem
often to be placed on an equal footing with expert judgment. 36
This reframing makes a response to the critique of everyday intuitions
possible. Context-sensitive variations in willingness to pay can be justified as
intransitivity rather than dismissed as incoherence; the preference for old over
new risks can be justified as tightly tracking the distinction between harming
"obscurely felt" and introspectively opaque feelings to moral judgment).
33. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 66.
34. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, Values, Risks, and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB.

AFF. 54, 58 (1988). Sunstein describes this as a "populist" perspective on values. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 54.
35. SUNsTE N, supra note 1, at 55.
36. Cf Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, andAgencies, 138 U. PA. L.

REv. 1027, 1099 (1990) ("When it comes to public risk, there simply is no objective view,
there are only 'conflicts between two sets of (inevitably subjective) judgments.' This takes
us back to ground already covered. Because the conflicts in question are not and cannot be
objectively grounded, they cannot be resolved on objective grounds. Much less should they
be consigned to experts whose competence lies in the technical arts. The question isn't
technical." (footnote omitted)).
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and not aiding, rather than dismissed as an imperfect proxy for welfare
considerations or as a mere psychological phenomenon without normative
backing; and concern about dreaded risks can be justified as tracking defensible
differences in values rather than dismissed as following from factual errors.
One worry about the above perspective is that any disagreement about facts
can be redescribed as a disagreement about values, and vice versa, such that
popular opinion can wholly swallow up expert opinion, or the reverse. Another
is the possibility that qualitative explanations of everyday intuitions prompted
by questioning do not reflect the genuine source of the intuition: "[W]hen
people are asked to say why they believe that some risk is especially bad, their
answers may not truly explain their beliefs, but instead represent post hoc
rationalizations of more visceral judgments (based partly on faulty quantitative
assessments)." 37

These are both legitimate concerns, but there are several good responses.
Of course it may be possible for people to disguise or rationalize attitudes about
risks that are, at bottom, grounded in a misunderstanding of the facts, as beliefs
grounded in differences in values. But we should remember that an action or
belief can be directly motivated by a visceral judgment while being more
indirectly motivated, or justified, by background normative facts.38 Imagine a
person driving along Interstate 280 from Palo Alto to San Francisco who has
made that drive many times before. She may well arrive in the Financial
District without ever having thought about the California Drivers' Handbook
whose rules she learned when she received her license; her driving was more or
less an instinctual rather than reflective matter. But the fact that she never
considered the law during her drive does not show that she would be wrong in
saying, if asked why she used her turn signal to change lanes, that she did so
because that is what the law required. Similarly, that someone's intuitive
response to a risk is not directly causally motivated by values does not show
that it does not ultimately flow from an underlying value. In fact, even an
intuitive response that a person explains, when asked, as being motivated by a
belief about probabilities may ultimately be motivated by an unarticulated
belief about values: the person may feel that the probability-based belief is a
more publicly defensible reason than the value that ultimately grounds the
response. 39 Of course, the danger of misrepresenting one's reasons always
arises when the sources of people's beliefs become relevant to the possibility of
enacting their values; 40 but this danger has not undermined deliberative

37. SUNSTErN, supra note 1, at 63.
38. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition:
Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 474-

75 (2007) (hypothesizing that white men's aversion to gun control derives from a
background self-conception that causes them to associate gun possession with the role of
father and protector); see also SLOvIC, supra note 28.
39. See Kahan et al., supra note 38.
40. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
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democracy and similarly does not undermine popular beliefs about risk.
As for the fact-value distinction, as with any concept, there are hard cases
at the borderline; however, hard cases should not vitiate a workable distinction
between fact and value.4 1 It may never be possible to provide an analysis that
perfectly separates facts from values; nonetheless, the capacity to investigate
facts is different from the capacity to investigate values.42 The existence of
hard cases does not show that there is not a defensible conceptual distinction.
What should establishing the normative respectability of laypeople's
intuitions lead us to conclude about the place of these intuitions and of their
rivals? The respectability of everyday intuition does not entail the abandonment
of cost-benefit analysis. Many of the points Sunstein makes are amply valid
ones: cost-benefit analysis can be an "excellent place not to end but to start"
our decisions about how to respond to risks. 43 And expertise about matters of
fact, such as the likely medical consequences of a chemical exposure or
economic consequences of an infringed patent, remains centrally important.
Finally, the proposed system should put expert judgments about values on
equal footing with lay intuitions, not ignore expert intuitions about value
entirely. After all, increased scientific or economic expertise does not
automatically devalue one's intuitive judgment-though we should be aware of
certain cognitive changes that may correlate with expertise, such as a reduced
willingness to see cooperation as rational.44
But the value of Sunstein's cost-benefit approach should not lead us to
make the opposite mistake: to let cost-benefit analysis drive laypeople's
intuitions from the scene. Part of what motivated Sunstein, and what is
appealing and attractive about his project and that of other cost-benefit
advocates such as Breyer, is the new perspective that cost-benefit analysis can
offer. This value can be lost if cost-benefit analysis comes to totally dominate
the decision-making arena to the exclusion of other perspectives, and exercises
a sort of normative imperialism over our judgments about risk.45
While cost-benefit imperialism may not seem like a genuine danger, it
could arise if the administrative state becomes dominated by cost-benefit
analysis, and administrative decisions driven by such analysis broadly preempt
state tort judgments. A similar concern arises when tort law is bypassed by no-

REv. 2061 (1992) (book review) (discussing the tensions that arise as religious discourse
tries to express itself while conforming to Rawlsian norms of public reason that require that
policies be justified based on reasons that everyone can accept).
41.
42.
43.
44.

E.g., G.A. Cohen, Facts andPrinciples, 31 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 211 (2003).
See SHRADER-FRECHETTE, supra note 2, at 43-45.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 110.
See Robert H. Frank et al., Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP.

187 (1996) (arguing, based on survey data, that increased education in economics and
evolutionary biology leads to reduced willingness to cooperate with others).
45. Cf John Duprd, Against Scientific Imperialism, 2 PHIL. Sci. Ass'N 374 (1995)
(arguing against one theory dominating all others in a scientific context).
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fault schemes that also rely on expert-driven cost-benefit analyses. As such,
what I would criticize is Sunstein's claim that cost-benefit analysis should be a
central part of our legal analysis. Although Sunstein sometimes suggests that
law should be approached from a different perspective than policy, 46 he more
often conflates law and policy when discussing the appropriate role of lay
intuitions and expert judgments.4 7 The two, however, seem different. Whether
or not "the judgments of ordinary people seem to be a good starting point for
policy," 48 the decisions of ordinary judges and juries are the appropriate

starting point for tort law. Tort law is a common law system largely constituted
by the aggregated precedent of past judges and juries. In particular, the
importance of the jury's role in tort law derives in large part from tort law's
concern with representing laypeople's intuitions. It may be that although we
should have a "cost-benefit state," we should nonetheless have a common law
driven by lay intuitions.

II.

THREE APPROACHES TO RISK: TORT, LEGISLATIVE COMPENSATION,
AND REGULATION

Within the broader realm of law that addresses risk and harm-what Henry
Steiner calls "accident law"-tort law is often contrasted with two alternative
approaches, both of which have statutory rather than common law origins. 49
One is legislative-administrative compensation, which generally includes
workers' compensation and auto no-fault. 50 The other is safety or risk
regulation, such as workplace safety, environmental protection, and the testing
of prescription drugs. 5 ' Both regulation and legislative compensation fall under
the umbrella of "public law," whereas traditional tort law is common law.
(Mass tort, however, often is seen as-partly out of necessity-straddling this
public-private divide.52 ) This Part will consider the differences between how
tort law, on the one hand, and these two legislative approaches, on the other,
incorporate everyday intuitions into their decision-making processes.
Before discussing and comparing these different approaches, it is worth

46. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 181 (differentiating the proper role of courts from
that of agencies).
47. E.g., id. at 29 ("[P]eople's intuitions about risks are highly unreliable.... [T]hey
lead to ineffective and even counterproductive law and policy."); id. at 64 ("[T]hat people
perceive certain risks and deaths as especially bad should not be decisive for purposes of law
and policy."); id. at 295 ("Some people think that it is important for law and policy to 'make
statements'-to express attitudes that all or most citizens find correct or congenial.").
48. See id at 10 (paraphrasing stance of critics of cost-benefit analysis).
49. See HENRY J. STEINER, MORAL ARGUMENT AND SOCIAL VISION IN THE COURTS: A
STUDY OF TORT ACCIDENT LAW 10-13 (1987).

50. See id. at 11-12.
51. See id at 12.
52. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 169 (1995).
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noting the progressive expansion of non-tort approaches and the contraction of
tort law. Much of what would have been formerly covered by a tort regime is
now covered by administrative and legislative interventions. One prominent
example is the choice to compensate victims of the September 11th attacks via
a legislative scheme, the September 1 Ith Compensation Fund, which Robert
Rabin argues gives us "reason to reflect on whether the Fund ... should be
regarded as a singular response or as a window for thinking about redress of
future victims of terrorist activity-or even, perhaps, victims of criminal
violence more generally." 53 Vaccine compensation presents another recent
example. The recent health care reform debate has generated new publicity
surrounding medical malpractice tort actions, and produced a push for
alternatives to tort in this sphere as well. As such, the debate between the
strengths of tort law and potential alternatives is real and not merely theoretical.
A. Tort Law andRisk Regulation: Courts Versus Agencies
Risk regulation has traditionally taken a much more expert-driven
approach than tort law. Regulators have been willing to engage in cost-benefit
analyses and comparisons: "For several decades, agencies have undertaken
cost-benefit analysis of major regulations, even when CBA [(cost-benefit
analysis)] is not the basis for decision but is merely a matter of informing the
public about the consequences of proposed courses of action." 54 Furthermore,
several specific statutes, including the Toxic Substances Control Act, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Safe Drinking
Water Act, incorporate cost-benefit analysis into their directions to agencies
implementing them.55 These analyses generally value costs and benefits using a
"willingness to pay" model, in which people in a controlled setting are asked
how much they would be willing to pay for a given change. 56
In fact, a greater reliance on administrative risk regulation rather than tort
law, precisely because of risk regulation's willingness to set aside everyday
intuitions about risk in favor of a more statistical model, has been a theme of
those, like now-Justice Breyer, who criticize tort and favor an agency-based,
administrative approach to risk:
Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on which all
progressive transformation of the risk environment must be based. The courts
are simply not qualified to second-guess such decisions; when they choose to
do so they routinely make regressive risk choices. Requiring-or at least
strongly encouraging-the courts to respect the comparative risk choices made

53. Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A
CircumscribedResponse or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REv 769, 769 (2003).
54. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFrr STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 76 (2002).
55. Id. at 14-15.

56. Id. at 77.
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by competent, expert agencies would inject a first, small measure of rationality
57
into a judicial regulatory system that currently runs quite wild.

Rather than tort, Breyer believes that a bureaucracy of scientifically
knowledgeable civil servants empowered to set priorities and allocate resources
to reduce risks is the most promising solution.5 8
In contrast, tort systematically has a greater sensitivity to lay intuitions
about risk, for which it is both praised and derided. This reflects the history and
institutional framework of tort law. Each tort suit that is brought into the legal
system, if not settled before trial, is considered on its own merits at least by a
judge, and often by a jury as well. These decisions are govemed by a
precedent-based system of law that looks back to other decisions made by
judges and juries. While there are exceptions to this, and efforts like the
Restatements of Torts inaugurate a more codified system of law, the common
law is by and large the law of common people's intuitions. Breyer offers a
critical perspective on this aspect of the legal system:
Courts also administer a system of tort law which discourages the
to
negligent production of risky substances by forcing producers ...
compensate those whom they injure. That system, however, leaves the
determination of "too much risk" in the hands of tens of thousands of different
juries who are forced to answer the question not in terms of a statistical life,
but in reference to a very real victim needing compensation in the courtroom
before them. The result is a system much criticized for its random, lottery-like
results and its high "transaction costs" ....

Likewise, judges, despite their greater legal expertise, are generally grouped
with laypeople rather than experts with respect to determinations of value. 60 So
the decision-making method that Breyer identifies can be seen as reflecting lay
intuitions-for good or evil-at work.
Another difference between tort and regulation, closely related to the one
Breyer identifies, is the perspective from which each approaches risk. Tort
approaches risk ex post, while risk regulation approaches risk ex ante. Foster et
al. take this difference to speak decisively in favor of the administrative
approach:
For all its imperfections, the regulatory process is far better suited than tort
57. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazardsof Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277,335 (1985).
58. BREYER, supra note 1, at 78 (proposing an increased role for "a small, powerful
group of especially well-qualified civil servants"); see also Gillette and Krier, supra note 36,
at 1030 ("Some . . . call for a reduction of the judicial role in risk assessment and
management, and for more reliance on administrative agencies. Agencies, they argue, have
more expertise, are more objective and rational, can be more attentive to the net effects of
technological advance. Courts, they conclude, should defer to them.").
59. BREYER, supra note 1, at 59.
60. See, e.g., Ken Kress, The Seriousness of Harm Thesis for Abnormally Dangerous
Activities, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 277, 288 (David G. Owen ed.,

1995) ("[J]udges are members of the public whose beliefs constitute conventional
morality.").
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law for controlling subtle risks. Regulatory agencies seek to inhibit risk ex
ante, just in case. Courts are only supposed to compensate people ex post, not
for risk but for proven harm. Regulators can, at least theoretically, aim for a
far higher level of protection than can possibly be achieved by tort law.61

They take for granted the superiority of ex ante compensation, and indeed this
norm for compensation has been more prominent recently. 62
However, both the ex ante and ex post perspectives have an important
place in a comprehensive response to risks, even subtle risks, and the way that
these perspectives fit together is complex. Consider a hypothetical case that
reveals the strangeness of taking a purely ex ante perspective to compensation
for a toxic exposure: Say that the exposure could be predicted to lead to each of
the ten people exposed having a 10% chance of developing liver cancer, but
that only one actually developed cancer. Pure ex ante compensation would
leave the actual cancer victim incompletely compensated for the harm he
suffered, since he only had a 10% chance of developing cancer and so only
would receive 10% of the compensation he would have received under an ex
post approach. Tort law, at least in the mass-tort context, has traditionally
rejected this result of purely ex ante compensation.63
On the other hand, taking both an ex ante and an ex post perspective will
result in "double counting," as Claire Finkelstein describes it. 64 If a polluter
exposes ten people to a 10% ex ante risk of cancer, and one of the exposed
people develops cancer, the polluter will have to pay more under a combined ex
ante/ex post regime than would have been the case under a purely ex ante
regime (where the polluter would have been responsible for the ten 10% risks
only) or a purely ex post regime (where the polluter would only be responsible
for the cost of the single cancer). As Weinstein asks, "[s]hould we allow what
some courts have considered impermissible 'double dipping'. . . ?"65 Even if
we should not allow "double dipping" within the context of a single system, it
may well be appropriate for overlapping administrative regulation and tort law
to enforce both ex ante and ex post compensation.

61. Kenneth R. Foster et al., Conclusion: Phantom Risk-A Problem at the Interface of

Science and the Law, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 26, at 431, 440 (emphasis omitted).
62. Cf Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 124
(2003) (noting that luck egalitarianism, which has dominated the philosophy literature, and
the rational expectations model of individual decision-making, which has dominated the
economics literature, both rely on an ex ante perspective).
63. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 148-52 ("The primary purpose of mass tort cases
has evolved to be compensation of victims.").
64. See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 990 (2003) ("If
the risk of harm were itself a harm, it would seem to follow that the person exposed to a risk
who suffers an outcome harm as a result is worse off than the person who simply suffers that
harm without the associated risk.").
65. WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 152-53.
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B. Tort Law andLegislative Compensation:Judge and Jury Versus Expert
Panel
Tort law's approach to risk can also be compared to another system of
compensation: the legislative-administrative model. In the United States, we
have seen this type of legislation used in response to black lung disease,
vaccine-related injuries, neurological injuries, and injuries and losses related to
the September 11th attacks. 66 These compensation schemes generally are
organized around a claims fund, often one that manufacturers of a specific type
of product pay into, and from which claimants can draw compensation. 67
Generally, these no-fault compensation schemes assess claims using some
sort of expert-developed tool tailored to the demands of the specific case at
hand, and are often managed by a special master. For instance, the vaccine
injury no-fault system uses a Vaccine Injury Table enumerating the injuries that
are assumed to be caused by vaccines.6 More relevant to the issue of risk and
everyday intuitions is that these no-fault schemes often are not individualized
to the particular harms that the claimant suffered. The vaccine scheme bases
recovery on the average earnings of workers in the nonfarm sector of the
economy, and caps recovery at $250,000.69 When calculating the wage-loss
component, some schemes also traditionally incorporate "scheduled limitations
based on type of harm and ceilings reflecting notions of horizontal equity" for
economic damages, and in some instances "modest, fixed-sum pain and
suffering" damages. 70 A proposal for an even more comprehensive legislative
scheme might follow the model of New Zealand, where tort is replaced by a
society-wide accident compensation plan. 7 1
Many proponents of administrative regulation also favor legislative
compensation solutions over tort law. Peter Huber, for instance, praises the
liability limitations involved in many no-fault schemes as an (albeit ad hoc)
improvement over tort law that protects industries that produce net public
benefits from the depredations of an out-of-control tort system. 72 And, indeed,
the decrease in the individualization of benefits similarly avoids the
66.

See Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L.

REv. 699, 703, 706, 708-10 (2005) (describing the Black Lung Benefits Act, the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, state legislation regarding birth-related neurological injuries,
and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund).
67. See id
68. See id. at 707.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 711. A notable exception is the much more individualized September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund. Id.
71. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 28-29. See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN,
DOING AWAY WrrH PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1989) (discussing the replacement of personal

injury tort law with alternative compensation schemes such as social insurance).
72. See Huber, supra note 57, at 328-29 (describing statutes limiting liability in
particular industries as necessary because of the judicial system's dismal record in
distinguishing good public risk investments from bad ones).
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arbitrariness for which tort is often criticized.
However, this strength of legislative compensation is also a potential
weakness: by losing its connection to the intuitively compelling claims of
unique individuals, it may end up ignoring important values. As Weinstein
points out:
What troubles many of us about an administrative remedy to provide
individual compensation is that in the absence of a strong independent bar and
bench, the system often deteriorates. At first, the system has great promise.
Often thereafter, either enough funds are not granted or the system falls under
the control of one economic interest or another. We see that repeatedly.
Workers' compensation was a splendid idea. But in many jurisdictions the
worker obtains such a small award that the courts have been almost forced to
find ways to circumvent the workers' compensation laws. 73
These problems with administrative compensation are in part pragmatic. There

are legitimate concerns about transitioning to a realm of solely administrative
schemes: loss of transparency and public accountability, and attendant
corruption or agency capture.74 Tort, by contrast, may be less vulnerable to this
sort of corruption.75 There are also transitional problems with moving from a
tort system to an administrative one: similar litigants may receive drastically
different treatment under tort and administrative recovery. 76
But there is a further, not merely pragmatic, value that is more centrally
related to our everyday intuitions about harm and risk, and that tort may have a
unique capacity to access. Weinstein puts it as follows:
How should we address a mass societal problem ... and give each individual
who is hurt a sense that, yes, somebody has heard me, somebody has listened
to me, somebody has tried to compensate me, somebody cares about me. The
tort system, when it works at its best, accomplishes this result. 7 7

Weinstein describes this phenomenon as one of "procedural justice," 78 but it
can also be seen as a matter of substantive justice. What is being afforded the
plaintiffs in a well-working tort system is not just a fair procedure, but one that

73. WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 163.

"

74. See id. at 169 ("I am suspicious of administrative systems because of the way they
have sometimes been manipulated. . . . It is the underlying suspicion of government-I say
this with great respect for the people who are administering the Black Lung Benefits Act and
the Vaccine Act-that gives us pause when we consider an administrative scheme ....
(citations omitted)); see also MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 215 (discussing the danger that "an
unchallengeable elite . . will be vulnerable to corruption and distortion of perspective").
75. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 169 ("[Tlhe tort system in this country, with all

its costs and with its lack of coherence, has the advantage of being out in the open and
independent of government abuse.").

76. See id. at 165 ("Someone who sued and recovered a judgment yesterday might get
a half-million or a million dollars for an injury. Someone with a similar injury, who may
have had a case pending for five, six, or more years, might get a few thousand dollars from
the new agency.").
77. Id. at 167.
78. Id.
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additionally expresses "recognition respect" for them as individuals.79 In
contrast, modern administrative schemes, for all their efficiency, can imply
"impersonal business bureaucracies, the absorption of individuals within
statistical categories, and related abstraction and dehumanization." 8 0
A further difference in the way that tort and legislative compensation
approach risk involves one of the values that might flow from our selfconception and that has emotional power. This is the idea that a tortfeasor has
committed a wrong, and that he, rather than the wider society, should provide
the victim with compensation. 8 1 This element of second-personal recognitionof the tortfeasor acknowledging the wrong he has done the victim-is
something that traditional tort, but not an institution-mediated administrative
scheme, can provide. 82
C. The Hybrid Approach: Mass Torts
Mass tort is at the boundary between tort law and public law alternatives.
Mass torts constitute a powerful regulatory tool in practice, but also require

many of the same methodologies of a jury and judge that administrative
regulation requires of an agency:

.

[C]laims of design defect and inadequate labeling ordinarily target
shortcomings of all specimens of a product, and they call upon juries (or
judges) to determine whether "the manufacturer's design specifications ..
themselves create unreasonable risks" .... To decide such issues, juries (or
judges) must engage in risk-utility balancing, a process analogous to the
inquiry conducted by a regulatory agency-except that it occurs within the
narrow confines of a single tort lawsuit, with its evidentiary limitations,
backward-looking perspective, and exclusive focus on the plaintiff's specific
injury.83

Weinstein also sees a clear nexus between toxic tort and regulation: "As tort
law is in fact administered in a mass tort case, with many cases in the hands of
a few lawyers, we provide a quasi-public, quasi-administrative system."8 4
However, the fact that mass tort has a foot in each camp does not yet show
us the best way to improve it. Perhaps it should become more administrative in
79. For the idea of recognition respect, see STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 123-24 (2006) (discussing the idea
that taking someone seriously in procedural deliberations confers recognition respect on
them).
80. STEINER, supra note 49, at 145.
81. See sources cited supra note 17.
82. See DARWALL, supra note 79, at 3 ("[T]he second-person standpoint [is] the
perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on one another's
conduct and will." (emphasis omitted)).
83. ALAN E. UNTEREINER, THE PREEMPTION DEFENSE IN TORT ACTIONS: LAw,
STRATEGY AND PRACTICE 6-7 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d

(1998)).
84. WEINSTEIN, supranote 52, at

169.
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nature, relying more on risk-utility calculations and scheduled damages. Or
perhaps it should try to recapture some of the old advantages of the tort system:
by adding more judges and law clerks, it can try to regain a more individualized
perspective that recognizes each litigant's unique position.
III.

TORT'S INSTITUTIONAL VALUE

Can the different attitudes of tort law and public law toward everyday
intuitions about risk be justified, or are they simply an accident of history?
Does one attitude toward everyday intuitions have to be the right one? This Part
will argue that tort and public approaches can coexist despite their different
attitudes toward everyday intuitions about risk, and, in fact, that they ought to
have different attitudes, because of their different institutional positions.
Consider the harming/not-aiding distinction discussed above. Tort law
captures this distinction through its focus on the particular victim bringing the
suit and his relation to the tortfeasor, while public law largely ignores it. Tort
law can be right to recognize the distinction, but public law can be equally right
to deny its importance. This is because of the different perspectives in which
they operate: tort law operates in the sphere of individual interactions, while
public law sees those same interactions from an institutional perspective. And
the doing-allowing distinction may operate in the individual sphere differently
from how it operates in the institutional one:
The lack of a washing machine by the family next door is not even in part my
doing or my responsibility just because I could have bought them one. But I
believe that such restrictions on what is usually called negative responsibility
do not apply in the same way to our relations to one another through our
common social institutions, especially an involuntary institution such as the
state, together with its economic structure. We are responsible, through the
institutions which require our support, for the things they could have
prevented as well as for the things they actively cause.

This difference between the institution and individual which Nagel delineates
can both explain and normatively justify the different attitudes of tort law and
administrative risk regulation toward everyday intuitions. 86
From the perspective of tort law, doing and allowing are legitimately
different: although tort is an institution, it is arbitrating interactions between
individuals-it is deciding whether or not failing to provide someone else with
a washing machine constitutes a tortious act worthy of compensation from the
other party. Here, the fact that the compensation comes directly from the other
party is crucial: tort law both reflects and generates a special, often adversarial,

&

85. NAGEL, supra note 23, at 84.
86. Sunstein has explored the individual/institution difference in Cass R. Sunstein

Adrian Vermeule, Is CapitalPunishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life
Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703, 721 (2005) ("[T]he [act/omission] distinction is least
impressive when applied to government.").
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relation between tortfeasor and victim. The tortfeasor can legitimately see
herself as burdened by the victim's individual needs, and the victim can see her
compensation as flowing not just from her need in a cost-benefit framework,
but from her entitlement not to be treated in certain ways.
In contrast, administrative risk and no-fault regulation involve an
institution interposing itself between individuals. The costs paid by those being
regulated, via taxes, fines, and fees, flow to the administrative state or to the
no-fault compensation fund; and the compensation to victims of harm flows
from the no-fault or administrative agency. There is no confrontation between
individuals: the person paying does not see the receiver of compensation as
burdening him, and the person compensated does not receive affirmation of her
entitlement. As such, it is appropriate for risk regulation and no-fault, as social
institutions creating institution-individual relations rather than arbiters of
individual relations, to ignore the distinction between old and new harms.
A. Preemption, InstitutionalPerspective, andInviolability

What should we do when tort law and administrative regulation both assert
authority over the same risk? This situation is one where preemption is at issue.
And, if the earlier claim that tort law and regulation should coexist because
they have fundamentally different stances toward harm can form the foundation
for an argument, can that administrative regulation preempt tort law where the
two cover the same domain?
Recently, the Supreme Court found in a 6-3 decision that a label's
compliance with FDA regulations on IV push, a method of administering
certain drugs, does not preempt a state tort suit b a person who was severely
injured by an incorrect administration of the drug.
Justice Alito's dissent argues explicitly for the primacy of FDA regulation
over tort law, in part because of agency determinations' indifference to, and
tort's sensitivity to, the normative distinctions that cost-benefit analysis
deemphasizes: "This case illustrates that tragic facts make bad law. The Court
holds that a state tort jury, rather than the [FDAL is ultimately responsible for
regulating warning labels for prescription drugs." Alito also argued that:
By their very nature, juries are ill-equipped to perform the FDA's costbenefit-balancing function. As we explained in Riegel, juries tend to focus on
the risk of a particular product's design or warning label that arguably
contributed to a particular plaintiff's injury, not on the overall benefits of that
design or label; the patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in
court. Indeed, patients like respondent are the only ones whom tort juries ever
see, and for a patient like respondent-who has already suffered a tragic
accident-Phenergan's risks are no longer a matter of probabilities and
potentialities.

87. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191-92, 1204 (2009).
88. Id. at 1217 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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In contrast, the FDA has the benefit of the long view. Its drug-approval
determinations consider the interests of all potential users of a drug, including
those who would suffer without new medical products if uries in all 50 States
were free to contradict the FDA's expert determinations.

The "tragic" nature of the facts of Wyeth v. Levine, contrary to Alito's claim, in
fact provides a justification for the Court's decision to uphold the tort jury's
decision. The jury's decision, precisely because it was motivated by the tragic
facts of the case rather than the same sort of cost-benefit analysis that motivates
regulation, did not tread on the proper institutional competence of the FDA.
Had the court justified its reasoning on the basis of an FDA-like judgment, it
might well have been appropriate to preempt its decision, since it would no
longer be playing a complementary role (as the majority opinion argued) but
simply a parallel one. 90 It is precisely the fact that the Vermont court was not
conducting a cost-benefit analysis, but was instead considering everyday
intuitions that cost-benefit analyses ignore, that made the refusal to preempt its
judgment appropriate.
The putative reasoning for which Alito criticized the jury-its prioritizing
the person before them over the interest of others who could benefit from a
decision not to help that person-in fact accords with a powerful and widely
shared intuition. This is the intuition that we cannot countenance a serious harm
to one person in order to benefit others, or even to protect those others from
harms. Consider, for instance, the philosopher Philippa Foot's famous example:
Suppose, for instance, that there are five patients in a hospital whose lives
could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas, but that this inevitably
releases lethal fumes into the room of another patient whom for some reason
we are unable to move. . . . The relatives of the gassed patient would
presumably be successful if they sued the hospital and the whole story came
out. 9 1

The situation in Wyeth is intuitively highly parallel to Foot's example.
89. Id. at 1229-30 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted); accord
UNTEREINER, supra note 83, at 9 ("Imagine a case where the driver of a car who suffers

abrasions to his scalp in a head-on collision sues the manufacturer, alleging that the car was
defectively designed because it lacked sufficient padding in the sun visor (where the impact
occurred). A jury might well agree with that claim, and impose compensatory and punitive
damages, without ever giving serious consideration to the additional accidents that would
materialize, and the pedestrians and other drivers who would be injured, if the extra padding
were used and the driver's visibility correspondingly reduced or impaired.").
90. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 (majority opinion) (holding that failure-to-warn claims
like the plaintiff's do not "obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling"); see also
Gregory D. Curfman et al., Why Doctors Should Worry About Preemption, 359 N Ew

NG. J.

MED. 1, 1 (2008) ("Previous administrations and the FDA considered tort litigation to be an
important part of an overall regulatory framework for drugs and devices; product-liability
litigation by consumers was believed to complement the FDA's regulatory actions and
enhance patient safety.").

91. PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICEs 29 (Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1978). Foot's
work has been highly influential in both philosophy and law; see, for example, CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 50 n.* (1978) (discussing Foot's hospital example).
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And, as with the example above, there is a strong intuition that no one should
cause one person to suffer ghastly injuries even if doing so might save others.
While this intuition is a contestable one-cost-benefit analysis might reject itit deserves some place in our reasoning about risk and harm. We may care
more about living in a world where it will be impermissible to treat us in
certain ways than we do about whether we are slightly more likely to be saved
from harm. 92
Because tort law does not, and should not, always undertake the same sort
of risk-benefit inquiry as administrative law would, my approach to preemption
is slightly different from that argued for by Professor Robert Rabin. Rabin also
supports a principle of resolving conflicts between tort law and administrative
decisions that centers on the reason for the decision, but believes it is
appropriate for the tort system to conduct a risk-benefit inquiry rather than
leaving such inquiries purely in the realm of administrative agency judgments:
In proposing a framework for addressing these tensions, based on focused
examination of whether the agency directive is grounded in the same
evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry as the tort process would entail, I join
those commentators who seek to forge a path that recognizes the distinct
93
benefits that both regulation and tort have to offer.

Rabin seems to assume that both the tort system and the agency evaluation
should engage in some sort of risk-benefit reasoning. As such, an agency
evaluation appropriately grounded in risk-benefit calculation should not be
revisited by the tort system. But if we grant tort a different scope from agency
evaluation, the situation changes. While Rabin is right that tort should not be
used "to revisit and supersede the regulatory approval process," 94 it may be
acceptable for tort to consider values that may never have-and perhaps should
never have-been brought into the process of administrative agency regulatory
approval. If the tort claim advances considerations outside the factors that a
risk-benefit inquiry would consider, then it has reason-grounded in
comparative institutional competence-to go forward. On this view, it can be
acceptable for a tort verdict to conflict with administrative agency
prescriptions, even though this conflict does not immediately justify revisiting
the regulatory approval process: the tort judgment and the administrative
guidance have different grounding justifications. The Respondent's Brief in
Wyeth, which argues that the tort judgment does not compel an administrative
conclusion, might be interpreted as expressing a similar view: "common law is
distinct from statutory and regulatory law because it fulfills primarily a
compensatory function, rather than a regulatory one." 95 Ultimately, this Note's
proposed view of Wyeth represents a counterpoint to Justice Alito's: "tragic
92. Kamm, Non-Consequentialism, supranote 17, at 386.

93. Robert L. Rabin, TerritorialClaims in the Domain of Accidental Harm: Conflicting
Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 987, 1009 (2009).

94. Id. at 1002.
95. Brief for Respondent at 43, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249).
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facts" are the appropriate institutional setting in which tort law should
intervene.
B. No-Fault, Escape into Torts, and Ex Post Compensation

The intersection between legislative compensation and tort poses a
problem that is in some ways analogous to preemption. Should we require
someone to waive her right to tort compensation in order to enter a
compensation system such as the vaccine compensation system? Studdert and
Brennan believe that we should:
[F]or the model we envisioned to be financially viable it would require
potential claimants to waive the right to sue, as occurred upon the
implementation of the system in New Zealand.... Simply grafting no-fault on
to the tort system would inevitably raise the overall costs of compensating
medical injuries. It would also be likely to put the purported benefits of nofault out of reach. 96

In addition, some also argue that those operating within a legislative
compensation system should not be subjected to tort liability, because freedom
from tort liability enables them to plan more predictably, without the danger of
jury caprice. 97
However, everyday moral intuitions again seem to point against enforcing

an agreement not to pursue a tort suit-or, at the very least, suggest that the tort
system should be available to someone who suffers severe harm. First, it seems
unfair that someone should have to suffer the bad consequences of their ex ante
choices, particularly choices made without knowledge of what suffering the
harm in question would be like. 98 This first explanation may rest on decision
makers' lack of knowledge, or potential irrationality, in making decisions about
risk.
Additionally, however, it may be intrinsically inappropriate to enforce an
ex ante agreement, even against someone who was fully knowledgeable about
what she was getting herself into, when enforcing it would lead the person to
lose out on something she would have had without the agreement. Frances
Kamm poses such an example:
[A] community is deciding the rules for . .. [an] ambulance. More lives
overall will be saved if it is agreed that when the ambulance is on its way to
the hospital with many people whose lives are to be saved, it will not stopeven though it could-to keep from running over someone in its way. Should
the community agree to this?

Kamm believes that, even if the community agrees to this, the ambulance
96. Studdert & Brennan, supra note 1, at 234.
97. Cf Huber, supra note 57, at 327 n.178 (discussing an interagency study criticizing
tort law "for failing to develop a clear standard of responsibility").
98. See Fried, supra note 62, at 150; see also Anderson, supra note 34, at 61-62.
99. F.M. KAMM, 2 MORALITY, MORTALITY: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUs 303 (1996).
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would still be required to stop and not run over someone-even though that
person might have agreed, ex ante, to be run over in such a situation:
"Preserving ... inviolability or personal sovereignty of a certain sort-may be
more important than increasing each individual's chances of survival ogiving
him the freedom to make any binding agreements that he wishes ... ."1 And
this intuition is a compelling one in Kamm's example. Even though the harm of
not having access to tort compensation is not as obviously serious as the harm
in Kamm's case, it could be quite severe depending on how low the legislative
compensation is, and how much better off one would have been under tort. It
may be inappropriate to set up a system that requires people to waive their
rights, or enforce an agreement against an unwilling person, under such
circumstances. This intuition makes the option of allowing access to tort
compensation for those who can show a more severe injury an attractive one. 10 1
CONCLUSION

The enduring value of laypeople's moral intuitions leaves us with two main
options when considering how to incorporate these intuitions into our decisionmaking processes. One is an amalgam of everyday intuitions with cost-benefit
and risk-utility analyses in the sort of "hybrid" system that Weinstein
proposes.102 This could be done by enhancing the place of deliberative
democratic institutions and public input in administrative decisions about
risk. 103 Or it could be done by introducing more expert control and cost-benefit
analysis into our system of tort law. 104
But another, and I believe preferable, alternative is to allow both tort law

and public law to continue to cover much of the same ground, using different
approaches and paradigms. When tort juries' or judges' intuitively motivated
decisions prohibit a substance that is allowed under cost-benefit calculations,
this generates a situation that the legislature can-should it wish-explicitly
settle by statute. This is in accord with our separation of powers: we have
statutory compensation (a legislative function), administrative regulation (an
executive function), and tort (a judicial function). And we can get the same
100. Id. at 307.
101. See Rabin, supra note 66, at 703-10 (discussing options to seek tort relief under
various legislative compensation statutes).
102. WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 168 (noting that "in the area of asbestos" we may be

left with a "semijudicial administrative model").
103. See, e.g., SHRADER-FRECHETrE, supra note 2, at 197-216 (arguing that to address

problems with equity of risk, "carefully structured citizen participation" is needed);
Anderson, supra note 34, at 63 (noting the need for "an institutional framework within which
people can better express their values and choose among alternatives").

104. Cf Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 65, 79 (2006) (noting
that "courts in tort cases could also take a 'preventive' perspective" which would require

"policy considerations about how to allocate the burden of scientific uncertainty between
plaintiffs and defendants").
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advantages of resiliency and "hybrid vigor" by continuing this mixed system
that we get in the larger government from our system of checks and balances. I
agree with Weinstein that "[d]eterrence of disasters by tort law or an
administrative or welfare compensation scheme is not sufficiently effective in
protecting society against the dangers of technology," and that we would
benefit from regulatory law as well as tort law and no-fault compensation.1 05
But we do not need regulatory law instead of tort law and welfare
compensation.

Retaining tort law as part of a pluralistic system may, of course, leave us
with some problems that we would not otherwise have. For instance, some
argue that relying on tort law creates a system that bases recovery excessively
on the talent of individual lawyers rather than the strengths of the individual's
claims.1 06 Others worry that, even if having one's story heard generates a sense
of dignity, the adversarial process can generate serious dignitary harms.1 0 7 In a
mass tort context, an a regate settlement can fail to provide participants with
And, of course, the tort system imposes substantial
recognition or respect.
financial and administrative costs on society, such as the broad social cost of
medical malpractice claims. Nonetheless, its unique advantages are worth
preserving, and this is so even if these advantages inescapably involve some of
the above disadvantages. The value of pluralism will outweigh its disvalue.
What Sunstein ultimately proposes is a sort of moderate technocracy-a
system centered around expert judgments, but with room for popular
opinion.109 This Note's proposal is that we adopt a moderate and pluralistic
populism, where everyday intuitions are central, but expert judgments are also

important. Under a moderate populism, not all everyday intuitions should be
incorporated into our accident law. Mistakes about facts, for instance, should
not be so incorporated. And there are good ways to differentiate between
mistakes about facts and differences about value. 1 0
105. WEINSTEIN, supra note 52, at 170.
106. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Don't Forget the Lawyers: The Role of Lawyers in
Promoting the Rule of Law in Emerging Market Democracies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 420

(2007) (raising a concern about "the potential for legal outcomes to be determined by
resources and not reason").
107. See MICHAEL KING ET AL., NON-ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE 2-3 (2009) ("The

[adversarial] process is regarded as antagonistic and confrontational, with primacy being
accorded to negating or destroying the opposition's case rather than to settling the dispute."
(citation omitted)).
108. See, e.g.,

Samuel Issacharoff,

Commentary,

"Shocked": Mass Torts and

Aggregate Asbestos Litigationafter Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1925, 1930 (2001)
(criticizing "Sunday-school oratory about the importance of the rights of individuals
standing before the courts" given "[t]he reality . . . that the economics of litigation and the
sophistication of the bar in this area have combined to leave far behind such nostalgic
renditions of an Aristotelian world of simple dispute resolution").
109. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 294-95.
110. Separation of matters of fact from matters of value is one appealing option. See

Foster et al., supra note 61, at 139 (discussing a "trifurcated" trial where the question of
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Now-Justice Breyer asserted that "[w]hatever its merits and problems, I do
not believe the tort system can serve as a substitute for government
regulation."I" This Note has examined one of the tort system's merits-its
ability to give our everyday intuitions a seat at the table in our national
conversation about risk. This merit does not justify replacing regulation with
tort, as Breyer fears, but it amply justifies keeping tort a continuing part of our
approach to accident law.

whether a drug caused a disease was separated from whether liability existed and what, if

any, damages were owed the plaintiff).
111. BREYER, supra note 1, at 59.
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